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Im 包cing great power rivals, arms control can contribute to American security in three
ways， First, the United States should avoid limiting weapons technologies where it enjoys
decisive advantages, like missile defenses，Over the longer term, as adversaries diversify their
own capabilities and catch up, limitation may become more desirable, but in the short term the
United States gains little by trading away areas of strength， Second, the United States should
focus on ensuring eqgza/ limitation of forces in which it can compete effectively with adversaries，
but cannot predominate, like strategic nuclear forces， Over the longer term equal agreements
will enhance the United States” major and durable geopolitical advantages，Third, the United
States should accept adversary advantages in categories of weapons in which the United States
does not wish to compete, like theater nuclear weapons，In these categories, the United States
has little to lose to conceding to adversary demands, especially ifthey are linked to adversary
concessions in other more important areas.
To maximize advantages fom the above three approaches over the longer term，
American leaders will need to pursue three Important tasks in the short tecrm，The first is to
compete vigorously with rivals in certain Imilitary-technical domains. Only a strong defense
program will provide the leverage necessary to bring rivals to the negotiating table. The second
ls to integrate arms limitation negotiations into American strategy, along the lines described
above. Finally, the United States must retain and expand its hard-won geopolitical advantages，
especially its network of alliances and security partners throughout Euraslia，Arms control can
Support an effective long-term strategy, but it cannot substitute for it: even very Successful
negotiations will do little to promote American security 让the fondamentals, such as alliance
Security, are allowed to crumble，
Past Competitive Arms ControlWhile arms control theory predicts that countries will use negotiations to advance their
mutual interests in reducing the threat from inherently dangerous technologies, the historical
record suggests that, in practice, arms control negotiations are often competitive.4 Rival great
powers move through a cycle of arms control negotiations: the contest for new weapons drives
states to negotiate and, in turn, negotiations shape future rounds of rivalry，States manipulate
this cycle to advance their own particular aims over ttmei; they will deploy weapons aimed at
shaping future negotiations in ways that benefit them, and they will negotiate agreements that
shape future rounds to their advantage， For example, the great naval powers of the interwar
period employed arms limitation negotiations to stall adversary naval construction, while
pursuing transformative technologies like aircraft and submarines that each party hoped would
prove decisive in future conflict.> Similarly, the United States used arms control negotiations
with the Soviet Union during the Cold Warto advance its“offset strategy,”]limiting the size of
Soviet forces while allowing the United States to leap ahead in weapon accuracy and reliability.4
How do great powers use arms limitation negotiations for advantage?” The most basic
way is by deciding which weapons to limit, and which weapons to leave unrestrained，Great
Powers that enjoy a substantial advantage over their rivals in a certain type of weapon are
unlikely to negotiate its limitation, and will instead prefer to exploit that advantage as much as
possible. Similarly, great powers that are dramatically behind in an Important weapons
technology will generally prefer to rectify that major disadvantage, rather than ratify and extend
4 John D. Maurer“The Purposes of Arms Control”7exas Natiozal Secu1zty Review 2, 1 (2018), 9-27，
http:/dx.doi.org/10.26153/tsw/870; Brendan Rittenhouse Green 77e Revolutiopn 太at Failed: Nuclear Comipetiziom 4d7zas
Coatrol and ipe Coid Jar (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 48-65.
S Emily O. Goldman, SowzKen 7T7eabhies: Naval 47710s Cojtrol Bethween 1jie Fars (University Park PA: The Pennsylvania State
University Press, 1994), 1S3-188.
6 John D. Maurer“The Forgotten Side of Arms Control: Enhancing U.S. Competitive Advantage, Offsetting Enemy Strengths,”
及ar oz 如e Rockis, 27 June 2018, https:/warontherocks.com/2018/06/the-forgotten-side-of arms-control-enhancing-u-s-
competitive-advantage-offsetting-enemy-strengths/.their weakness into the future. Negotiations will instead focus primarily on technologies which
both great powers are capable of producing and exploiting and whose Ultimate benefit to either
Slide ls therefore ambiguous，Under those circumastances, great powWers will seek to use
negotiation to bolster their edge in that given technology.
Historically, we can see that great powers have engaged in negotiations selectively to
promote their military-technical advantages. During the naval arms limitation negotiations ofthe
1920s and 1930s, for example, the United States and Great Britain preferred stricter limitations
on asymmetric weapons technologies like submarines, which were potentially detrimental to
their power-pProjection capabilities. Yet the Japanese, French, and Italians would not agree to
limit this technology, which they believed could serve their interests in offsetting the battleship
advantages of other countries.” On the other hand, during the early Cold War the United States
tried to freeze the strategic nuclear balance in a position of significant American numerical
Superiority，Umnsurprisingly, Soviet leaders would not accept inferiority in such a crucial
category of weapons, and continued their own buildup until they reached numerical Parity with
the United States in the late 1960s.8
Rivalrous great powers generally avolid arms control negotiations when they believe that
unilateral measures will allow them to Prevalil over Tivals, but when the future balance of
capability is less certain they will use negotiations to promote their own strengths，The search
for advantage through arms control often results in early rounds of negotiation in which each
power demands obvious, unilateral advantages in number and quality of forces over its Tival.
Yet paradoxically negotiation can only promote one\'\"s relative advantage 让the adversary
7Joel ITra Holwitt“Execudtfe 48gaipst.JCpa1 7THe LS Decisioz 1o Coaduct Lizrestzicted SUD1a1zzjpe az1re (College Station，
TX: Texas A氏M University Press, 2009), 29-42.
8 James Cameron, 77He Powpie Garme: THe Denzaise of dpezica SFirstMissile Defezase Systema ad ie Rise of Strategic 47110S
Zizaztafion (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018), 49-106.
4
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